Introduction
entirely unknown as we perceive only their sensible qualities. 8 Hume wants to find out what this inference from cause to effect is founded upon. The stakes are high, as Hume considers the inference from cause to effect to be the cornerstone of all our knowledge about the world, except for mathematics. 9 Hume notes that, although the premise of a predictive inductive inference is true, the conclusion can nevertheless be false. Although we have always perceived the same cause and effect, their connection is not a necessary truth: 'the mind can always conceive any effect to follow from any cause, and indeed any event to follow upon another: whatever we conceive is possible, at least in a metaphysical sense'. 10 The conclusion that 'all swans are white' was, until Dutch explorer Willem de Vlamingh in 1697 was the first European to see a black swan in Australia, considered a fact. 11 De Vlamingh thus falsified the previously considered universal truth that all swans are white. Hume concludes from the fact that inductions can produce false conclusions from true premises that induction can not be a rational inference. The claim that induction is not a rational inference depends, according to Aubrey Townsend, on two steps. The first is to conclude that induction is not 'demonstrative', or deductive. In the second stage he also needs an argument to show that if induction is not demonstrative but probable, then still it is not a rational inference, because it rests on a presumption that can only be justified by a circular use of inductive reasoning. 12 Hume, in line with Cartesian thinking, believes that rational reasoning is by definition error-free and inductive inferences can therefore not be rational. The only way we can make inferences from the impression to the idea (induction) is, according to Hume, by relying on experience of the constant conjunction of the objects in question. Hume writes: 'even after we have experience of the operations of cause and effect, our conclusions from that experience are not founded on reasoning, or any process of the understanding.' 13 The core of Hume's argument is the claim that all probable arguments presuppose that the future resembles the past (the Uniformity Principle) and that the Uniformity Principle is a matter of fact. That the future resembles the past is, however, not something we derive from reason but from experience alone. Hume argues that because 'it is no contradiction that the course of nature may change', any object between inductive and deductive arguments is that, if the premises are correct, the outcome of a deductive argument will always be correct as well. This is not the case in inductive reasonings, as Hume pointed out. If the addition of the Uniformity Principle would render an inductive argument deductively valid, then the Uniformity Principle must be false, because the principle would be shown to be false by every inductive failure. Stove's lines of reasoning renders the Uniformity Principle false, something which most people would not be willing to accept.
The success of science
Another reply to Hume is by pointing out the success of the application of inductive reasoning in science. The fact that I am writing this essay on a computer can be considered proof that the rules of physics, on which the technology enabling the existence of this computer are based, are in fact true. These rules of physics are, in turn, based on ampliative reasoning through inductive inferences. From this follows that inference is a valid way of concluding the universal from the particular. Other modes of obtaining knowledge, such as divination, do not have such a reliable track record and are thus inferior to the empirical sciences. The problem with this justification is that it uses the scientific method to justify the scientific method. To predict that the scientific method will continue to be successful in the future because it has been successful in the past is a circular argument. There is, according to Popper, 'no such thing as a logical method of having new 17 Davide Stove, 'Hume, probability and induction', in: V.C. Chappell, editor, Hume: A collection of essays, (1966 ideas' and discovery of scientific theories always contains an irrational element. 21 Albert Einstein refers to this irrational element as an intuition, based on empathy (Einfühlung) with experience. 22 This in contrast to Isaac Newton, who insisted that he does not invent theories (hypothesis non fingo) and that intuition plays no role in science. 23 It is interesting to note that according to his assistant John Conduitt, Newton discovered a critical aspect of the theory of gravity not from meticulous observations of planetary motion, but from an apple he saw falling from a tree. 24 Popper's philosophy of science is, however, not a form of irrationalism, but 'critical rationalism'. Popper argues that every theory should be subjected to a rigorous critical testing regime, aimed at attempting to falsify that theory.
Critical rationalism is closely related to Popper's view on the problem of induction. His solution to the problem is, in short, that science actually does not use induction as a means to obtain new knowledge. As scientific theories are based on conjectures, scientists can only make deductions from the conjectured theories and test whether the predictions are valid by looking for possible refutations.
Popper believes that Hume's refutation of inductive inference from a logical point of view is clear and conclusive, but he is dissatisfied with Hume's psychological explanation of induction in terms of custom and habit. Hume believes in the psychological power of induction; not as a logically valid procedure, but as a procedure which animals and people make use of. 25 The answers given by Hume to the logical and psychological problems of induction lead to the conclusion that inductive inferences are irrational. All knowledge, according to the Humean view, is mere irrational habit or custom and is rationally totally indefensible.
Popper is not satisfied with this sceptical conclusion and believes that he has a solution to Hume's psychological problem. He reformulates Hume's problem by widening the scope from instances to laws and by including counterinstances (refutations). Hume's modified problem of induction now reads: Are we rationally justified in reasoning from instances, or from counterinstances, of which we have had experience to the truth or falsity of the corresponding laws or to instances of which we have had no experience? given.
It is a nearly generally agreed view that the problem of induction can and has to be solved only within the framework of an ontological reality and acceptance of the Uniformity Principle. 27 Acceptance of the Uniformity Principle is problematic and in recent times the principle has come under attack from philosophers and physi- that we need to go beyond the determinism of the Uniformity Principle and find a way to embrace 'indeterminism' in physics. The Uniformity Principle allows prediction of future events, based on patterns from the past. The same principle also allows to 'postdict' past events by looking at the current situation. The laws of physics, as they are based on the Uniformity Principle, also allow prediction and postdiction of events. In physics, the direction of time does not seem to matter. In everyday life, however time certainly seems to have a direction; we can't 'unstir' a cup of tea to separate the milk from the tea and we always get older, but never any younger, and so forth. Nature involves both time-reversible and time-irreversible processes, but irreversible processes are the rule and the reversible the exception. 29 If Prigogine is right and time-irreversible processes are the rule, then the Uniformity Principle is not only uncertain, but actually wrong and can only be interpreted as a category of the mind.
The Success of Technology
There does not seem to be any satisfactory solution to the difficulties Hume raised.
Popper's theory is only a partial solution, as it presupposes the Uniformity Principle, which in turn can not be justified. Are we left with the world as an unpredictable chaos? Are we forced to admit that, in the words of punk singer Johnny Rotten: 'There is no solution to the problems, so enjoy the chaos'?
The apparent success of technology, however, seems to disprove the sceptical conclusions of Hume and Prigogine's call for indeterminism. We are surrounded by technology that validates the laws of physics which are all based on deterministic models of reality derived by inductive reasoning. We are left with a reality without logical justification. If there is no logical justification for scientific inferences we are forced to accept instrumentalist theories. In my work as a professional engineer I often say that there is nothing more practical than a good theory. Instrumentalism is, in this context, the view that concepts and theories are merely useful instruments whose worth is measured not by whether the concepts and theories correctly depict reality, but how effective they are in explaining and predicting phenomena. 30 Instrumentalism is not an answer to the logic problem of induction, as argued is 
